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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 18-2707
_____________
WILLIAM GRIBBLE,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI; ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-09-cv-02091)
District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 24, 2021
Before: CHAGARES, HARDIMAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 30, 2021)
_______________
OPINION
_______________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.

MATEY, Circuit Judge.
William Gribble argues his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, leading to
a murder conviction. Seeing some merit, we will vacate the District Court’s order in part
and remand in part for an evidentiary hearing. As to the rest of Gribble’s arguments, we
will affirm the District Court’s order.
I. BACKGROUND
Gribble and his girlfriend Kelley O’Donnell were convicted of first-degree murder
and related offenses. After exhausting all remedies available in the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth courts, Gribble petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming ineffective
assistance by his trial counsel. Adopting the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, the
District Court found Gribble’s claims untimely and lacking merit. The District Court, and
this Court, both declined to issue a certificate of appealability (“Certificate”).
Gribble then asked the District Court to reopen the judgment, arguing that a change
in law announced in Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), saved his claim. The District
Court denied the motion and again declined to issue a Certificate. We granted a Certificate
to consider whether Martinez excuses his procedural default.1 It does, in part, and so we
will remand in part.
II. ANALYSIS
A.

Legal Standard
We review the denial of a motion to reopen a judgment for abuse of discretion,

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and we have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2253 and 1291.
2

meaning a decision based on a “clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous conclusion
of law, or an improper application of law to fact.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir.
2014) (citing Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999)). Martinez excuses a
procedural default “caused by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel . . . in
the . . . first collateral proceeding” if “the underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness
is ‘substantial,’ meaning ‘the claim has some merit.’” Id. at 119 (quoting Martinez, 566
U.S. at 14); see also Richardson v. Superintendent Coal Twp. SCI, 905 F.3d 750, 762 (3d
Cir. 2018).
We evaluate Gribble’s claims using two standards. First, proving ineffectiveness by
post-conviction counsel requires “show[ing] deficient performance . . . as required under
the first prong” of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).2 Workman v.
Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Brown v. Brown,
847 F.3d 502, 513 (7th Cir. 2017)). To show deficient performance, Gribble’s “state postconviction counsel’s performance [must have fallen] below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Id. at 941.
Second, to show that a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel is
“substantial” and has “some merit,” Gribble must show that “reasonable jurists could
debate” its merits or that it “deserve[s] encouragement to proceed further.” Id. at 938–39
(quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)) (noting that the Martinez
2

That is because the second prejudice prong of Strickland is “established with a
substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that would otherwise have been
deemed defaulted.” Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 941 (3d Cir.
2019) (quoting Brown v. Brown, 847 F.3d 502, 513 (7th Cir. 2017)).
3

standard is “less exacting than Strickland”). But there is a “strong presumption” that trial
counsel’s conduct “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 943 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
B.

Trial Counsel’s Alleged Failures
Gribble argues he is guilty not of first-degree murder, but only a crime of passion.

He asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present five pieces of evidence
to support this theory and that post-conviction counsel likewise failed to raise these errors.
We consider each piece of evidence in turn.
1.

Gail Stacy, Rose Stoddart, and the 911 Calls

First, Gribble points to the police statement of O’Donnell’s friend, Gail Stacy.
Gribble argues that Stacy would have testified to a romance between O’Donnell and the
victim, one unbeknown to Gribble. He reasons this testimony supports his crime-of-passion
theory, showing that he reacted in rage when he unexpectedly discovered O’Donnell with
the victim. But this testimony is inadmissible hearsay. Pa.R.E. 801. And other parts of the
statement undermine the theory—O’Donnell told Stacy that “she and [Gribble] had done
something big and she had money,” described the murder to Stacy the day after, and said
that Gribble had taken $196 from the victim’s pockets. (App. at 50, 52–53.) Under the
circumstances, trial counsel may have had a sound strategy for not calling Stacy to the
stand.
Gribble also claims that trial counsel should have called Rose Stoddart, an employee
of the victim’s store, to testify that she saw the victim give O’Donnell money from his cash
register earlier that day. But Stoddart’s testimony supports the Government’s theory that
4

O’Donnell saw the victim as a source of money for her drug habit, a view she shared with
Gribble. And Stoddart admittedly did not see the full interaction. Instead of Stoddart,
Gribble’s trial counsel elicited testimony from another store employee to rebut the
Government’s evidence. The claim that trial counsel was ineffective here is not substantial,
because relying on one employee over another under these circumstances is a matter of
sound trial strategy.
Gribble then brings up two 911 calls placed from the scene of the crime around the
hour it occurred. The first was from O’Donnell saying that her husband was beating her;
the second was from someone requesting an ambulance because O’Donnell had “just had
a seizure.” (App. at 59.) Gribble claims both establish a timeline of the killing supporting
his heat-of-passion defense. But omitting this evidence was not unsound trial strategy.
O’Donnell called 911 at 2:42 a.m., and police arrived at 2:50 a.m., reporting that no one
would answer the door. If introduced, this call would have been scrutinized, and
O’Donnell’s hospital records an hour later show no evidence of bruising and no
corroborating statements made to hospital staff. Nor is the second call helpful, as the
paramedic who responded to the scene testified that O’Donnell did not appear to have
suffered a seizure. Both calls cast doubt on O’Donnell’s credibility, strengthen the
Government’s theory of a conspiracy, and trial counsel reasonably elected to omit them.
2.

Medical Examiner and Neighbor Evidence

Evidence from the medical examiner and upstairs neighbor require closer
examination, and we will remand to the District Court for further factual development to
consider whether trial counsel was effective. See Lambert v. Warden Greene SCI, 861 F.3d
5

459, 472 (3d Cir. 2017); Richardson, 905 F.3d at 764.
First, trial counsel failed to ask the medical examiner about his post-mortem report
showing that the victim suffered facial injuries consistent with an assault. Gribble argues
this shows a confrontation with the victim rather than a sneak attack. Given the medical
examiner’s acknowledged inexperience, we see no reasonable trial strategy in failing to
question his report, so post-conviction counsel failed to raise a claim of ineffectiveness.
Second, trial counsel failed to introduce testimony and a 911 call from a neighbor,
Joe Boles, who recalled hearing screams, which sounded to him like “someone being killed
downstairs.” (App. at 426–27.) Seeing no strategy to ignore this witness or his emergency
call, reasonable jurists could debate the merits of trial counsel’s effectiveness. So postconviction counsel’s performance was deficient, and we will remand for an evidentiary
hearing.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we will vacate in part and remand in part to the District Court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to consider whether the failure to elicit testimony from the
medical examiner and neighbor rendered Gribble’s trial counsel ineffective. We will affirm
the District Court’s order as to the remainder of Gribble’s claims.
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